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Summary
Although in many Western legal regimes 
women have a right to terminate pregnancy 
on request at the relatively late stage of 
gestational age of the foetus, a remarkable 
paradigm shift in law concerning women’s 
reproductive freedom and status of the 
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This evolution has occurred outside the 
abortion framework in a form of wrongful 
life suits, preconception and prenatal 
torts or foetal homicide laws. According 
to some commentators it has created a 
conspicuous discrepancy between status 
of the foetus in the abortion context 
and its standing in other branches of 
law, particularly in so-called prenatal 
harm lawsuits. In this paper I am going 
to analyse theoretical background that 
bear prenatal injury lawsuits out. The 
core thesis of the paper is the contention 
that any adjudication in prenatal harm 
lawsuits presupposes some theory 
of identity. This in turn means that 
plausibility of these adjudications 
depends not only on their consistency 
with our moral intuitions but also on 
the plausibility of a given background 
theory that endorses these adjudications. 
I identify the theory of causality as the 
main background theory of the concept 
of prenatal harm and argue that it is 
structurally unable to justify it; what is 
theory of identity.
In this paper I shall critically scrutini-
se the Bedingung der Moeglichkeit of 
the prenatal harm concept. I hypothe-
sise that any consistent idea of prenatal 
harm must presuppose some theory of 
identity. To boot, I claim that there is a 
-
-
ut presupposing a theory of identity is of 
the greatest importance because these 
theories are strongly engaged in the de-
fence of women’s rights, especially right 
to terminate pregnancy on demand up 
to some point in time, usually the 24th 
week of gestational age of the foetus. 
According to these theories, with an out-
standing position of the so-called inte-
rest view amongst them, the apparent in-
consistency between status of the foetus 
within the law that recognises prenatal 
harm on the one hand and abortion law 
on the other can be overcome only by 
abstracting from the question of identi-
ty. Harming the foetus in a minor way 
should be legally forbidden not because 
foetus is a human person – the same per-
son as the future child developed from 
this foetus – but because it will cause 
harm to the future person that will be 
metaphysically distinct from this foetus. 
What Is Wrong with Prenatal Harm?
What is wrong with prenatal harm? For 
the proponent of the right-to-life position 
the answer is quite simple: nothing at 
Łukasz Dominiak
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies 
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Prenatal Harm and Theory of Identity
    15/2013 
Political Dialogues
Keywords: theory of identity, prenatal harm, abortion law, women’s rights, non-identity problem, 
the interest view, essentialism, causality, Different People Choice, Same People Choice
47
all. Since foetus is a human person – the 
same person as the future child – har-
ming it should be punished analogically 
to harming a child. This question, howe-
ver, is getting complicated when one is 
not the right-to-life proponent and wants 
to simultaneously protect the women’s 
right to abortion and punish them and 
 In the United States “several jud-
ges have expressed the view that reco-
gnition of prenatal wrongful-death suits 
court maintained that it is ‘incongruous’ 
to allow a woman the constitutional right 
to abort and yet hold a third party lia-
ble to the foetus for merely negligent acts 
(…) Conservatives see hypocrisy in reco-
gnising prenatal wrongful-death actions 
while also allowing abortion; liberals 
worry that recognition of prenatal wron-
gful death will threaten women’s rights 
of reproductive choice” (Steinbock 2011, 
p. 122-123).
 This inconsistency is even more 
jarring when one wants to justify pu-
nishing women, doctors or others for in-
at the same time wants to grant women 
the right to abort the foetus. Our consi-
dered moral judgement is utterly against 
this solution since we believe that to ter-
minate life is worse than to harm some-
body in a minor way.
Can We Overcome the Inconsistency?
According to the interest view this appa-
rent inconsistency and also predicament 
for the proponents of the reproducti-
ve freedom can easily be overcome. The 
key issue here is to dismiss the premiss 
which this incongruence is dependent 
on, namely the theory of identity and all 
debates that surround this question. To 
put it more analytically, the quandary 
with prenatal harm can occur only when 
two conditions pertaining to the theory 
must be the same entity as the futu-
re child; second, it must be the foetus 
who is harmed in prenatal harm acts. 
Additionally, one could say that the third 
condition here is that it is the foetus that 
is harmed by abortion but this third cla-
two.
 So, Bonnie Steinbock writes: 
“The interest view denies moral and le-
gal status to the early-gestation foetus, 
-
gal abortion. However, acceptance of the 
interest view does not preclude prenatal 
torts, that is, civil suits brought aga-
inst physicians whose negligence causes 
children to be born with serious injuries. 
when the child is a foetus, it is not the fo-
etus, but surviving child, who is affected 
and wronged by the negligence. Allowing 
surviving children to recover for injuries 
that preconscious foetuses have intere-
sts, rights, or moral or legal status. There 
is no contradiction in a legal system that 
both allows for abortion and allows reco-
very for prenatal torts” (Steinbock 2011, 
p. 109).
 The interest view explicitly says 
that the second condition saying that it 
is the foetus who is harmed in prenatal 
be harmed neither by abortion nor by ne-
gligent acts because for an entity to be 
harmed it must have interests. To have 
48
interests in turn an entity must be con-
scious; “without conscious awareness, 
beings cannot have interests” (Steinbock 
2011, p. XIV) and exactly for that reason 
“preconscious foetuses do not have in-
terests” (Steinbock 2011, p. XV). In this 
paper I will not discuss if Steinbock’s 
concept of interests, consciousness and 
foetal development is sound or unsound. 
I deal here only with metaphysical un-
derpinnings of the concept of prenatal 
harm in the context of liberal abortion 
law.
 
namely the claim that foetus must be the 
same entity as the future child? Is this 
condition also abandoned by the interest 
view? This is where things start to get in-
teresting. 
The Necessity of the Theory of Identity
First and foremost, there is no doubt that 
if the foetus was the same entity as the 
future child that would weaken women’s 
reproductive rights; killing the foetus wo-
uld mean killing the same kind of being 
as you and me. But is foetus the same 
entity as future child according to the in-
terest view?
 As Bonnie Steinbock writes, the 
interest view proponent is “a sceptical 
agnostic about essentialism” (Steinbock 
2011, p. 76) according to whom the pro-
blem of prenatal harm and abortion law 
can be resolved without recourse to the 
theory of identity. This position of the 
interest view is strengthened by further 
Steinbock’s considerations on precon-
ception torts according to which “duty 
of care can exist even before the concep-
tion of the individual injured by the ne-
gligence” (Steinbock 2011, p. 111). What 
is important for the interest view is the-
refore the theory of causation, not the 
theory of identity. “One relevant factor 
is causation” (Steinbock 2011, p. 111). 
Commenting on Jorgensen v. Meade 
Johnson Laboratories Steinbock writes: 
“Assuming that causation could be es-
tablished, the fact that the injury resul-
ted from preconception conduct was no 
reason for denying recovery” (Steinbock 
2011, p. 112). 
 Does this causalistic solution 
work? I claim that it does not and that 
for the interest view or other Biological 
Causality Accounts the theory of identity 
is unavoidable. Let’s conduct the follo-
wing series of thought experiments:
1) Main Thought Experiment
Imagine that there is a woman in the 
4th month of pregnancy who takes a pill 
that causes detrimental mutation in fo-
etus’ genes that in turn causes moderate 
mental disability in the future child (let’s 
call this child Mark for the sake of conve-
nience). Let’s assume further that it hap-
pens in such a way “that causation could 
be established” and after thoroughgoing 
investigation we prove that mother’s act 
caused genetic mutation which caused 
the disability. Can we conclude from this 
that this woman (the mother) harmed 
Mark?
 Of course, we cannot answer 
such a question without some metaphy-
sical background theory. To reach this 
conclusion we need something more than 
causation alone, we need some theory 
of identity that is able to rationally and 
decision does not represent what Derek 
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1987, p. 355-356) because if it does, then 
mother’s action does not harm Mark but 
rather decides who is going to live, Mark 
or some other person. In a word, theory 
of identity constitutes Bedingung der 
Moeglichkeit of both the concept of pre-
natal or preconception harm and the an-
swer to our question.
 To explain it in a more detailed 
way let’s stop our main thought experi-
ment for a second and turn into classic 
philosophy of identity and proposed by 
Jeff McMahan in his paper on wrongful 
life suits:
2) The Preconception Case
“A man and a woman are considering ha-
ving a child but suspect that one of them 
may be the carrier of a genetic defect 
that causes moderately severe cognitive 
impairment. They therefore seek to be 
screened for the defect. The physician 
who performs the screening is negligent, 
however, and assures the couple that 
there is no risk when in fact the man is 
a carrier of the defect. As a result, the 
woman conceives a child with modera-
tely severe cognitive impairments. Had 
the screening been performed properly, 
a single sperm from the man would have 
been isolated and genetically altered to 
correct the defect (…) Notice, however, 
that the probability is vanishingly small 
that the sperm that would have been iso-
lated and altered would have been the 
very same sperm that in fact fertilised 
the egg during natural conception (…) 
In that case the child who would have 
been conceived had the screening been 
done properly would have developed 
from wholly different pair of gametes and 
thus in fact (…) have been different child 
from the retarded child who now exists” 
(McMahan 2004: 445).
3) The Prenatal Case
“A physician negligently prescribes a po-
werful drug for a woman who is in the 
eight month of pregnancy. The drug cau-
ses damage to the foetus’s brain and 
the child to whom she gives birth is, as 
a consequence, moderately cognitively 
impaired (…) In that case, it seems clear 
that the retarded child who develops as a 
result of the brain damage is numerically 
the same child as the child who would 
have existed had the damage not been 
done” (McMahan 2004, p. 446).
 Since we believe that life with 
moderate disability is worth living and 
undoubtedly better than non-existence, 
the child in the Preconception Case by 
since the concept of harm presupposes 
making somebody worse off than he wo-
uld have been if the act in question had 
not been performed. The Prenatal Case 
in turn involves harm to the child be-
making him worse off, other things being 
equal. 
 Now explaining the statement 
that the interest view must have at its 
disposal some  theory of identity that 
-
monstrate that mother’s decision in our 
main thought experiment does not re-
present this sort of decision and action 
Choice, we can say that McMahan sug-
gests that the Preconception Case re-
presents Different People Choice where-
as Prenatal Case is thought of as being 
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a nutshell, Different People Choice is this 
kind of decision and action that affects 
identities of future people or affects “who 
1987, p. 355); if this sort of decision was 
made there would be different people in 
the world than there would be if this sort 
of decision was not made. Same People 
Choice on the other hand does not affect 
identities of future people; if this kind of 
decision was made there would be the 
same people in the world that there wo-
uld be if this kind of decision was not 
made; in Same People Choice only life 
conditions of people involved change for 
worse or for better.
In What Way Is the Theory of Identity 
Unavoidable?
Let’s come back now to our main thought 
experiment. Which of these two sorts of 
choices is represented by the woman’s 
decision to take the pill that causes men-
tal disability in Mark? My claim is that 
the answer to this question depends on 
the theory of identity we espouse. To put 
it more analytically, I claim that:
1) any distinction between Different 
People Choice and Same People Choice 
must rely on some theory of identity;
Preconception Case (or generally this 
sort of cases) with Different People 
Choice on the one hand and the 
Prenatal Case (or generally this sort of 
cases) with Same People Choice on the 
other as present in McMahan’s theory is 
3) since to establish the occurrence of 
harm in prenatal and preconception 
lawsuits it is inevitable to demonstra-
te that allegedly unlawful act does not 
represent Different People Choice, any 
concept of prenatal harm must deploy 
some theory of identity; for that reason 
it is impossible to base the concept of 
prenatal harm only on the theory of 
causality. Let’s now elaborate on each 
of these points.
1) To decide which of these two choices 
(Different People Choice or Same People 
Choice) we deal with, we must compare 
two lines of life: factual and counterfac-
tual. In our thought experiment factual 
line of life is Mark with moderate intel-
lectual disability; counterfactual line of 
life is person X without moderate intel-
lectual disability that would have been 
born if the mother had not taken the pill. 
-
parison we have to ask ourselves: would 
Mark and person X be the same person 
or different people? For Mark and X to be 
the same person there had to be some 
relation between them that would make 
thinking about them as the same person 
have to be? It would have to be the same 
relation that when holds between person 
A today and person A1 at some future 
time (in a year for instance) makes A 
and A1 the same person at different ti-
mes. That would have to be the relation 
that constitutes personal identity over 
time but used for our comparison of fac-
tual person with counterfactual person. 
Let’s call it R relation. If R relation held 
between Mark and X we would have to 
come to the conclusion that Mark and X 
would be the same person. So, the an-
swer to the question  which of these two 
choices (Different People Choice or Same 
People Choice) we deal with depends on 
the question if Mark and X could be ju-
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then we would have Same People Choice; 
if not, Different People Choice. But to 
answer the second question, namely if 
of as R-related, we need some theory 
about what kind of relation constitutes 
personal identity, what kind of relation is 
R relation. It could be psychological con-
tinuity relation, the same genetic code, 
the soul, the same brain, the same or-
ganism, the same mind etc. But in any 
case we need some substantive theory 
of identity to justify our distinction be-
tween Different and Same People Choice. 
For the simple question: How to decide 
if Mark and X are the same person? The 
simple answer is: by consulting the the-
ory of what it means to be the same per-
son.
he called The Time-Dependence Claim, 
according to which: “If any particular per-
son had not been conceived when he was 
in fact conceived, it is in fact true that he 
it more uncontroversial and changed the 
phrase “when he was in fact conceived” to 
“within a month of the time when he was 
in fact conceived”. The Time-Dependence 
Claim is not necessarily true since it de-
pends on the theory of identity and there 
are theories of identity that differ or can 
differ considerably. If one believed that 
for R-relation to hold it is enough to have 
only small amount of the same genetic 
material, then the Time-Dependence 
Claim would not be true. It happened 
that for McMahan’s theory of identity 
which says that R relation consists in the 
same embodied mind (McMahan 2002, 
p. 66-94) the Time-Dependence Claim 
holds to such an extent that considera-
ble change in genetic material (different 
spematozoon, different ovum) would 
with a great probability (but not neces-
sarily) result in different brain whereas 
moderately severe cognitive impairment 
is not big enough a change to talk abo-
ut different people. So for McMahan the 
Preconception Case coincides rather with 
Different People Choice than with Same 
People Choice but for the proponent of 
for instance some variant of The Same 
Genotype Account of Identity even minor 
genetic change resulting in moderately 
severe cognitive impairment could con-
stitute the instance of Different People 
Choice.
3) There are only two possibilities for 
woman’s decision to take the pill that 
causes disability in Mark: it can be 
Different People Choice or Same People 
Choice. If it is Different People Choice 
her child since for this child there was 
no other option than to exist with mo-
derate mental disability; otherwise the 
child would not have existed at all and 
there would have been different child 
there; and since non-existence is worse 
than life with moderate disability, the-
mother’s decision. If it is the case then 
the concept of prenatal harm is spurio-
us and so is legal recognition of it. So, 
for the proponents of prenatal harm law 
it is not enough to prove that there is a 
causality relation that holds between the 
act, the foetus, the future child and the 
disability. They have to show that the 
supposedly harmful act does not repre-
sent Different People Choice. But to do 
this they must harness some theory of 
identity that explains which differences 
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between factual line of life and counter-
factual line of life are adventitious and 
which are essential.
Conclusions
The interest view and other Biological 
Causality Accounts that try to justify 
both the concept of prenatal harm (it is 
is not the foetus who is harmed but fu-
ture child) on the one hand and liberal 
abortion law (abortion on demand up to 
some point in time should be recognised 
as women’s right since there is nobody 
there that could be harmed by abortion 
and there is no future child that could be 
the victim of prenatally caused harm) on 
the other without referring to metaphy-
sical category of identity is structurally 
unable to do it. It cannot demonstra-
prenatally or earlier does not represent 
Different People Choice; but without sho-
wing it the concept of prenatal harm in 
a sense promoted by the interest view is 
empty and unsound. Any consistent ca-
tegory of prenatal harm must be based 
on some theory of identity. 
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